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The value of analogical modeling in
scientific theory construction has been
endorsed by a number of philosophers of
science (e.g., Hesse, 1966; Harré, 1976;
Abrantes, 1999). This article provides
a brief overview of the important, but
neglected, research strategy of analogical
modeling. The strategy has proved to be a
valuable resource for the development of
many scientific theories. It can be a valu-
able resource for developing psychological
theories as well.
ANALOGICAL MODELING
The need for analogical modeling stems
from two features that are often present in
the initial generation of scientific theories.
First, as with exploratory factor analysis,
for example, the generation of theories
takes the form of explanatory reasoning
known as existential abduction, through
which the existence, but not the nature, of
theoretical entities is postulated. In these
situations, a suitable research strategy is
required in order to learn about the nature
of these hidden entities. Analogical mod-
eling is an appropriate strategy for doing
the required elaborative work. Second, the
postulation of theoretical entities through
existential abduction confers an assess-
ment of initial plausibility on those pos-
tulations. However, for claims about those
latent entities to have the status of genuine
knowledge, further evaluative work has to
be done. The construction of appropriate
analogical models serves to assess further,
the plausibility of the expanded under-
standing they afford, as well as to expand
our understanding of those entities.
In science, increasing our knowledge of
the nature of our theories’ causal mecha-
nisms by analogical modeling is achieved
by using the pragmatic strategy of con-
ceiving of these unknown mechanisms
in terms of what is already familiar and
well understood. Well-known examples of
models that have resulted from using this
strategy are the model of chromosomal
inheritance, based on an analogy with a
string of beads; the model of natural selec-
tion, based on an analogy with artificial
selection; and computational models of
the mind, based on analogies with the
computer. With respect to the objects of
scientific investigation, the strategy of ana-
logical modeling can be represented in the
following sequence:
PHENOMENA are produced by
CAUSAL ENTITIES, which are rep-
resented by ANALOGICAL MODELS
OF CAUSAL MECHANISMS
which lead to THEORIES CONTA-
INING DEVELOPED ANALOGICAL
MODELS.
In order to understand the nature of
analogical modeling further, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between a model, the
source of the model, and the subject, or
target, of the model (Hesse, 1966; Harré,
1976). From the known nature and behav-
ior of the source, one builds an analogical
model of the unknown subject or causal
mechanism. To take a biological example,
Darwin fashioned his model of the subject
of natural selection by reasoning by anal-
ogy from the source of the known nature
and behavior of the process of artificial
selection. In this way, analogical models
play an important creative role in theory
development.
However, this creative role requires the
source from which the model is drawn to
be different from the subject that is mod-
eled. For example, the modern computer
is a well-known source for the modeling
of human cognition, although our cog-
nitive apparatus is not generally thought
to be a real computer. Models in which
the source and the subject are different
are sometimes called paramorphs. This is
a requirement for the analogical modeling
of real and imagined processes. Models in
which the source and the subject are the
same are sometimes called homeomorphs.
For example, a toy aeroplane can be a
homeomorphic model of a real aircraft.
The paramorph can be an iconic represen-
tation of real or imagined things. Iconic
representation combines elements of visu-
alizable and propositional information in a
picture-statement complex that ultimately
can be expressed in sentences. The idea of
the field of potential in physics is a good
example because it is represented in both
graphical and sentential form.
It is iconic paramorphs that feature cen-
trally in the creative process of theory
development through analogical model-
ing. Iconic models are constructed as rep-
resentations of reality, real, or imagined.
They stand in for the hypothesized causal
mechanisms. Although they are repre-
sentations, iconic models are themselves
things, structures, or processes that corre-
spond in some way to things, structures,
or processes that are the objects of model-
ing. They are, therefore, the sorts of things
sentences can be about (Harré, 1976). Here
we should note that scientific theories that
aremodels represent the world less directly
than theories that are not models.
In addition to developing nascent the-
ories, the strategy of analogical modeling
also serves to assess their plausibility. In
evaluating the aptness of an analogical
model, the analogy between its source and
subject must be assessed, and for this one
needs to consider the structure of analo-
gies. The structure of analogies in models
comprises a positive analogy in which the
source and subject are alike, a negative
analogy in which the source and subject
are unlike, and a neutral analogy where we
have no reliable knowledge about matched
attributes in the source and subject of the
model (Hesse, 1966). The negative analogy
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 348 | 1
7
Haig The strategy of analogical modeling
is irrelevant for purposes of analogical
modeling. Because we are essentially igno-
rant of the nature of the hypothetical
mechanism of the subject apart from our
knowledge of the source of the model, we
are unable to specify any negative analogy
between the model and the mechanism
being modeled. Thus, in considering the
plausibility of an analogical model, one
considers the balance of the positive and
neutral analogies (Harré, 1976). This is
where the relevance of the source for the
model is spelled out. Generally speaking,
the analogical reasoning scientists employ
is informal, and is based upon plausibility
arguments.
ANALOGICAL ABDUCTION
Reasoning by analogy is an important
form of inference, but it is difficult to
characterize precisely. Because analogical
reasoning results in new knowledge claims,
it is ampliative, or content-increasing, a
feature it shares with inductive reason-
ing. However, unlike arguments based on
inductive inference, arguments based on
analogy can produce knowledge claims
about new kinds of things. Briefly, we
may say that an analogy is an argu-
ment based on assumed, or known, par-
allels or similarities between two or more
objects, properties, or events. What is
known about one class of entities is
employed to learn more about the other
class of entities. A good analogical argu-
ment provides an understanding of the
less familiar in terms of the more famil-
iar by discerning that the two are alike
in relevant respects, but not in other
respects. As already mentioned, reason-
ing by analogy from the known function-
ing of computers to the less well known
character of human cognitive processes
is frequently undertaken in psychological
research.
Analogical reasoning is important in
science and obviously lies at the inferential
heart of analogical modeling. It should be
emphasized that abductive, or explanatory,
reasoning, is an important form of scien-
tific reasoning in its own right. Because
the theories fashioned in science are often
explanatory theories, the use of analog-
ical modeling in order to develop those
theories will necessarily involve combin-
ing the two forms of reasoning to produce
a creative form of reasoning known as
analogical abduction. Science often seeks
to improve the quality of an explanatory
theory by appealing to a similar type of
explanation that is known and accepted by
the scientific community. In this way, ana-
logical reasoning of an abductive kind is
employed.
The reasoning involved in analogical
abduction can be simply stated in the form
of a general argument schema as follows:
Hypothesis H about property Q was
correct in situation S1.
Situation S1 is like the situation S2 in
relevant respects.
Therefore, an analog of H might be
appropriate in situation S2.
Darwin’s (1958) theory or model of
natural selection, and the other aforemen-
tioned analogical models, make essential
use of analogical abduction. The general
argument for analogical abduction just
given can be rewritten in simplified form
for Darwin’s case follows:
The hypothesis of evolution by artifi-
cial selection was correct in cases of
selective domestic breeding.
Cases of selective domestic breeding are
like cases of the natural evolution of
species with respect to the selection
process.
Therefore, by analogy with the
hypothesis of artificial selection,
the hypothesis of natural selection
might be appropriate in situations
where variants are not deliberately
selected for.
In formulating his theory of natural
selection, Darwin took advantage of the
two most important features of analog-
ical abduction: Its ability to create, and
its ability to justify. In reasoning by anal-
ogy, using known facts about artificial
selection, Darwin was able to hypothesize
the parallel mechanism of natural selec-
tion that explained diversity among nat-
ural species. At the same time, he was
able to appeal to the epistemic worth of
his carefully crafted analogy and proclaim
the plausibility of his hypothesis of natu-
ral selection. Numerous creative scientists
have been able to exploit the resources of
analogical abduction in this manner.
THE DRAMATURGICAL MODEL
An instructive example of an analogi-
cal model in psychology is Rom Harré’s
(1979) role-rule model of microsocial
interaction. With the role-rule model,
Irving Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical
perspective on human action provides
the source model for understanding the
underlying causal mechanisms involved in
the production of ceremonial, argumenta-
tive, and other forms of social interaction.
This model too can be presented in accor-
dance with the simple argument schema
used immediately above in order to display
the bare-bones structure of its analogical
abductive reasoning:
The theory of dramaturgy provides a
correct account of behavior on the the-
atrical stage.
Behavior on the theatrical stage is like a
good deal of human behavior in social
life.
Therefore, by analogy with the the-
ory of dramaturgy, much human social
behavior might be understood and
monitored as actors on life’s stage.
The basic idea of the dramaturgical per-
spective is that we observe and hear a sim-
ulacrum of life on the stage, and that our
knowledge of how this is produced pro-
vides us with a guide to the creation of
real life. Goffman’s dramaturgical perspec-
tive provides a detailed analytical account
of the roles and rules human agents follow
on life’s stage combined with a “watchful
consciousness” of the actor, the producer,
the audience, and the critic.
As a source model, the dramaturgi-
cal model has both positive and negative
analogies for there are clear similari-
ties and differences between real life
and dramatically staged acts. Regarding
similarities, Goffman noted that to be
understood as the person they are portray-
ing, the actor has to act in manner that
parallels what the audience would expect
of that kind of person. Clearly, there are
differences between stage drama and real
life. The differences involve sequences of
acts and actions that are at once selec-
tive, simplified, and heightened. For exam-
ple, in comparison with real life, only
a limited number life sequences are fol-
lowed, time is compressed, and resolutions
are effectively reached (Harré, 1979). The
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reduction in the number of life sequences
and the compression of time are abstrac-
tive processes. The use of successful res-
olutions is an idealized move. In these
ways, the modeling strategies of abstrac-
tion and idealization are employed to sim-
plify the complex domain of microsocial
interaction.
CONCLUSION
Analogical modeling in science is a risky
cognitive undertaking. In practice, it
involves reading widely in neighboring
disciplines for potentially fruitful source
models, and selecting those source mod-
els that have worked well in theories
that are judged similar to the the-
ory being developed. In addition, the
methodology of modeling through ana-
logical abduction provides useful guid-
ance for expanding scientists’ knowledge
of latent causal mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Harré, 2004; Haig, 2014). Of course, the
relevant limits of the similarity relation
between the source and subject of the
model are decided with reference to con-
tingent matters of fact that are specific
to particular cases, not by reference to
general advice on analogical modeling.
Unlike psychology’s modal research prac-
tice of evaluating hypotheses via simple
hypothetico-deductive testing, the evalu-
ation of analogical models involves mak-
ing plausibility judgments about them.
However, these judgments need to be
strengthened by subsequently comparing
the developed theories to their rivals
before themodels can be regarded as prop-
erly credentialed. Researchers who want to
engage in analogical modeling will have
to adopt more of a do-it-yourself attitude
than is the custom in psychology.
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